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FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
Meals and Lodging Furnishedfor the Convenience of the Employer
Two Sequels to the Boykin1 Case
In Rodney E. Wolf, 2 taxpayer and his wife were both faculty
members at a boys' school where they were required to live. The
cost of their lodgings and meals was deducted from their salaries.
In filing
their joint tax return for 1954, taxpayers excluded
$1000, 3 which comprised these costs, from their $5450 salary.
The Commissioner disallowed this exclusion, and as a result
determined an income tax deficiency of $185. The taxpayers took
their case to the Tax Court, and on June 30, 1958, that court
handed down a memorandum opinion sustaining the Commissioner's action. In their briefs, both parties agreed that the
Boykin case was in point, but the taxpayers simply argued that
the Tax Coures decision with respect to Boykin should not be
followed. The Boykin case at that time was awaiting a review
by the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
Mr. and Mrs. Wolf appealed their case on July 3, 1958 to
the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and while
their case was awaiting review, the Boykin reversal was handed
down by the Eighth Circuit Court in October. In May, 1959,
the Internal Revenue Service issued a ruling4 which stated that
the Boykin case as finally decided by the Eighth Circuit Court
would be followed for tax years subsequent to 1954 and that
"(steps will be taken to conform the Treasury Regulations and
outstanding rulings to the Boykin decision." When the Wolfs'
1

1n October 1958, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in Boykin
v. Commissioner (260 F. 2d 249) reversed the Tax Court by holding that
a physician required to occupy quarters at a Veterans' Hospital could
exclude their rental value which had been charged against his salary.
The Tax Court (29 T.C. 813), in disallowing the exclusion, had relied
upon Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1(c)(2) (1956), which states that to qualify
for the exclusion the meals and lodging must be "furnished in kind,
without charge or cost to the employee.' (Emphasis supplied).

227 P-H Tax Ct. Rep. & Mem. Dec. 58-129 (1958).
3Money amounts throughout this article have been rounded off.
4

Rev. Rul. 59-307, 1959-2 Cum. Bull. 48 (TIR No. 158 of May 21, 1959).
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appeal came up on the docket of the Fourth Circuit Court in
June, 1959, the Commissioner had conceded that the Tax Coures
finding should not be upheld, and accordingly the Fourth Circuit
Court summarily reversed on stipulation of the parties and without any discussion of the issues.'
The Internal Revenue Service was quickly given an opportunity to follow the Boykin case as it had indicated, for on May
29, 1959, the case of William I. Olkjer6 came before the Tax
Court. In this case, the taxpayer was a construction engineer in
Thule, Greenland where, because of the remoteness of the jobsite,
the only living facilities available for him were furnished by his
employer, the United States Army. Pursuant to this contract
with the Army, taxpayer paid his employer a fixed sum of $5.75
a day from his salary for "meals, lodging, laundry, drydeaning,
social services, hospitalization, medical expenses, and temporary
dental care." From his 1954 salary of $20,600 he excluded $1770,
and from his 1955 salary of $5170 he excluded $437, these
amounts comprising the $5.75 per day payments which he
claimed were excludable under the provisions of Section 119 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. The Commissioner in his
brief stated specifically that he did not urge the views he had
expressed initially in the Boykin and Wolf cases, which he mentioned by name. In effect he conceded that, despite the Treasury
Regulation to the contrary,7 the mere fact that an employer
charged for meals and lodging furnished an employee should not
of itself preclude the employee from excluding such meals and
lodging expenses if they could otherwise qualify under Section
119.8
5

Wolf v. Commissioner, 264 F. 2d 82 (4 Cir.; 1959).
632 T.C. 464 (1959).
7

Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1(c)(2) (1956).

8

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue advanced as the principal issue in the
case whether the meals and lodging were "furnished primarily for the
convenience of the employer (ant thus excludable) or whether they were
primarly for the convenience of the employee (and therefore taxable)."
e Commissioner contended that employee's convenience outweighed
employer's. The Tax Court found that the taxpayer had sustained his
burden of showing that he had no choice but to accept the facilities proffered by the employer at the jobsite, in view of its remote locale and
notwithstanding tat he was not on twenty-four hours call and that the
facilities furnished were of convenience to him as well as to his employer.
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From this chain of events, it is apparent that the issue is
closed. Whether an employee must reimburse his employer for
meals and lodging will no longer have a bearing on their excludability under Section 119. Henceforth, they will be excluded
if they otherwise meet the tests of that section. It is unlikely that
any U. S. Courts of Appeal other than those of the Fourth and
Eighth Circuits will ever have an opportunity to consider cases
focusing on this issue. The Internal Revenue Service has conceded the point, has issued a ruling on it, and the die has been
cast.
Logically the new policy makes sense, for it puts taxpayers
who are obliged to pay their employers for their quarters on a
parity with those taxpayers who are furnished quarters without
charge or who are given a special monetary "allowance" for quarters. For example, consider a taxpayer in the first category who
receives a salary of $1250 monthly of which $250 must be paid
back to his employer for his quarters. This is the Boykin situation.
Compare him with a taxpayer in the second category who receives
$1000 plus his quarters free, and a third taxpayer who receives
a $1000 salary plus a $250 allowance which he must return to
the employer. There is no reason why all three taxpayers should
not pay the same tax, since their take home pay, as it were, is the
same in each case. The Boykin case, as well as the Wolf case
which followed it, were ultimately decided in conformity with this
reasoning.
Although the Boykin, Wolf, and Olkjer cases ostensibly
clarify another aspect of the meals and lodging exclusion under
Section 119, they have actually served merely to make one more
inroad into a phase of the income tax system which has undergone constant and inexorable erosion since 1919, when seamen
were first allowed to exclude the value of their meals and berthing furnished them aboard ship. 9 The seamen were quickly
followed by hospital employees, 0 military officers," hotel em91 Cum. Bull. 71 (1919).

100.D. 915, 4 Cum. Bull. 85 (1921).
lIClifford Jones, 1 U.S.T.C. ff 129, 60 Ct. Cs. 552 (1925).
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ployees, 12 state troopers,13 resident faculty members, 14 and countless others, so that by 1954 the pathway was so thoroughly trod
that the exclusions were made a part of the 1954 Code at Section
119.15 Clergymen were specifically given preferred treatment by
the Code, 16 and for a time the Code gave policemen special tax
benefits with respect to allowances for food while on duty. 7 The
concept that meals and lodging are personal living expenses and
therefore taxable has been all but abandoned in those situations
where an employee is deprived by his employer of his choice of
where to procure them.
As long as a special exclusion for meals and lodging exists in
its current form, the miasma of conflicting rulings and cases attempting to formulate a consistent policy on the subject will
continue to frustrate both the taxpayer and the government. No
clear policy can ever be formulated which rests on a patently false
and illogical premise. No silver thread of consistency can ever
be found, for under such circumstances it simply cannot exist. 18
12Benaglia v. U.S., 97 F. 2d 996 (9 Cir.; 1938).
13Hyslope, 21 T.C. 131 (1953); Saunders, 21 T.C. 630, 21 F. 2d 768 (3 Cir.;
1954).
14

Rev. Rdl. 59-409, 1959-2 Cum. Bull. 48.

15

For a thorough and well documented development of the history of the convenience of the employer rule, see Gutkin and Beck, Some Problems in
"Convenience of the Employer," 36 TAXES 153 (March 1958).

16

Section 107, Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 107.

17Id., § 120, which was repealed on September 2, 1958 by § 3(a) of P.L.
85-866 (72 Stat. 1607).
18 The difficulty in this area is compounded when one seeks to determine what
policy governs how the "family" fits into the meals and lodging exclusion.
This problem is one of considerable proportion and continues to confound
the taxpayer as well as the Internal Revenue Service. For example, Rev.
R. 59409, (1959-2 Gue. Bull. 48) required, in effect, that a qualifying
teacher living on campus prorate his meals and lodging expenses between
himself and his family and to exclude only the value of meas and odging
appertaining to himself, a determination obviously difficult even of rough
estimation much less a fairly accurate computation. The impracticality of
such a ruling was evidently realized rather suddenly, for some hasty patchwork was performed by the Internal Revenue Service in its extremely
brief Rev. Rul. 60-348, (1960 Int. Rev. Bull. No. 45, at 9) which, without
attempting to define policy, merely withdrew Rev. Rl. 59-409. This palliative action still leaves the Internal Revenue Service with the task of
facing the problem squarely and providing a comprehensive solution. Just
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No one would seriously argue that food and lodging do not
constitute personal expenses, any more than one would contend
that medical or child care expenses were not personal. No matter
what one's occupation is or where it leads him, he will always be
obliged to feed himself and provide a home. The Code 19 clearly
sets forth the policy for tax treatment of personal living or family
expenses: the point of departure in dealing with all such expenses
is that they are not deductible from income and hence taxable.
Why the highly personal expenses of subsistence and lodging
should be afforded special tax treatment simply because a taxpayer is limited in his choice of where to procure them defies
logical analysis. 20 If we are to maintain consistency with the
general doctrine that normal personal expenses are not deductible,
then we must radically revamp the provisions of Section 119.
No test of "compensation," "convenience of employer," "condition of employment," or restriction as to where one must dwell
or eat should ever be applied to determine the non-taxability of
income received to cover normal personal living expenses. An
economic benefit always accrues to anyone who receives meals or
lodging from his employer without charge or at a reduced cost.
That economic benefit is tantamount to income, and it should be
included as such on the employee's tax return whether it is
labeled "compensation" or not. Whether such income is received
in kind or as a cash allowance should make no difference either,
for it is nonetheless income. The proper test to determine the
excludability of meals and lodging expense should be: Is the taxpayer deprived of a choice as to how much of his total income he
can spend to acquire these necessities? Where the answer is yes
and he has been required to expend excessive sums in proportion
what esoteric distinction the Service intends between the expression withdrawn and terms such as rescinded and revoked, which are frequently found
in its rulings, has never been made absolutely clear, but the more timorous
term withdrawn would seem to connote something less than incisiveness in
attempting to formulate policy. Add Section 107 of the Code to the picture
and hope of discovering a silver thread becomes even more remote, for in
Section 107, although the term family is not used, it is apparently settled
that the term clergyman includes his family for purposes of allowing an
income exclusion for the value of his parsonage.
19Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 261, 262.
20

See, e.g., Frueauff, 30 B.T.A. 449 (1934); Chandler, 41 B.T.A. 165 (1940);
and Reynard, 30 B.T.A. 451 (1934).

Noms

to his income, then and only then should he be provided with tax
relief. 2 '
This concept is not new. Congress has recognized a need for
special legislation in other areas where excessive personal expenses
are involuntarily incurred, and special dispensation in the forms of
tax credits, exclusions, and deductions, has been granted in the
tax law as to those excessive amounts. The most obvious instances
are the child care" and the medical expense.2 deductions. In both
of these areas formulas have been evolved (and embellished, as
inequities have become manifest through their application) which
are based on the quantum of income and which recognize some
amount on which it is the taxpayer's duty to pay taxes. Where
application of these formulas reveals that these expenses exceed
the normal amount which a taxpayer should be expected to incur,
then the tax benefits come into play to relieve his burden. These
formulas are concededly artificial and at times even arbitrary, and
in their application, some taxpayers fare better than others, but
the formulas are fundamentally sound, for they recognize the
basic concept of the taxability of income received for normal
personal expenses. Why should not this concept be applied to
meals and lodging?24
In order to derive such a formula for meals and lodging, it
is necessary to recognize the axiom that although expenses for
21

0in O. Ellis, 6 T.C. 138 (1946) recognized the logic of distingihin normal
and excessive lodging expenses, but in applying their theory, te court
came up with an inversion of the theory proposedhere. In Ellis, employee
hotel manager moved to more expensive acmmodations than those necessary for him to occupy for the convenience of his employer, as determined
by the facts of the case. The orion of rental attributed to the employer's
convenience was allowed to fe excluded from employee's income, while
the excess was held taxable.

22

Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 214.

23Id., § 213.
2
24Sonsa
Support for this general argument can be found in Harrington, Viewpoints on
Reforming the Federal-Tax System (TAX POLICY, July-August., 1960,
p. 13). This article is a summary of the hearings on the general revision
of the federal tax system conducted by the House Ways and Means Committee in 1958-59. One of the panelists recommendedthat the exclusions
of the value of meals and lodging for the convenience of the employer
should he considered for amendment. It was stated in the hearings that
this exclusion is a windfall for many and permits many employees to live
in a style to which they would otherwise be unaccustomed.
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meals and lodging are not directly proportional to income, they are
to a substantial extent a mathematical function of income; that
is, as income increases, less is spent, proportionately, for the basic
necessities of meals and lodging. But the taxpayer's income
always has a bearing on how much he spends, and where his
expenditures are voluntary, his income is the chief controlling
factor. It would seem propitious, then, bearing in mind that
normal personal expenses should not receive special tax treatment,
to replace the present provisions of Section 119 with a formula
which would require every taxpayer, no matter what his income
stratum or his vocation, to include as income the value of all
meals and lodging received for which he does not have to pay.
He should further be required to pay a tax on what he would
normally be expected to spend, in the light of his financial circumstances, for such necessities. Where his vocation requires him
to consume food or to shelter himself at an expense in excess of
this norm, then as to that excess the taxpayer should be granted
relief, either in the form of an exclusion or a deduction. Only at
this point should the tests of employer's convenience or business
necessity enter, and then only to determine the employee's lack
of choice in the matter.
If such an approach were adopted in redrafting those parts of
the Code involving these areas, the turmoil and uncertainty over
treatment of meals and lodging in the tax system would be virtually eliminated. A firm structure of tax regulations and rulings
could be built on the basis of what would be a fundamentally
sound and realistic personal expense policy. Furthermore, the
new doctrine would extend to meals and lodging incident to
business travel, and would simplify several problem areas in that
field.
True, taxes would be higher for some, but if the government
were to become embarrassed by the increased revenue received
as a result, it should in no event tamper with the personal expense
doctrine which is so fundamental to the federal tax system. There
are a multiplicity of other devices available to alleviate the situation. If the clergyman is palpably discomfited, and society wishes
to favor him, Congress can do as it did with World War II
servicemen, and simply exempt an additional part of his income
from taxation. If military officers' quarters and subsistence
allowances, which are presently tax-free, are merged into his
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taxable basic pay, and his take home pay is thereby lowered, the
government need merely raise his salary. "Allowances" for meals
and lodging would be ultimately eliminated from employees'
compensation (and bookkeeping would be considerably simplified) for, being taxable, no advantage would be gained by so

labeling them.
To summarize: Practically speaking, no human being can be
absolved of the necessity of providing himself with sustenance and
a shelter. These activities consume a considerable amount of his
time, effort, and, in a civilized society, money. When he spends
money, his expenditures are essentially and inescapably personal.
When he receives meals and lodging free of charge, he is economically benefited, and he therefore receives income, which
should be reported. The bare fact that a taxpayer's work deprives
him of a choice as to where he can obtain these basic necessities
should never be determinative of whether he can obtain tax relief
with respect to them. No matter where he obtains them or how,
obtain them he must. It is only when he must expend amounts
for meals and lodging in excess of what would normally be expected of him in the light of his income that the government
should step in and afford him tax relief. The federal income tax
structure should be altered to reflect the logic of this proposition.
RExporw R. CmKmE,.AN

